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 PERSPECTIVES
 Democratization and
 Decentralization in Post-Soeharto
 Indonesia: Understanding
 Transition Dynamics
 Paul J. Carnegie
 1998, following Soeharto's demise, Indonesia underwent a transition
 from authoritarian rule amidst much anticipation but no small amount
 of concern.1 Thankfully, in the intervening years, it has now become the
 world's third largest democracy.2 Yet, how and why the archipelago's
 democratic institutions became established and accepted remain difficult
 questions to answer. Indeed, some influential commentators voice legitimate
 concern about oligarchic reorganization within the new framework of
 democratic institutions.3 They see the ability of Soeharto-era predatory
 interests to secure new political allies as, effectively, emasculating institutional
 and policy reform.4 From this perspective, there has been a hijacking of the
 consolidation process.5
 Highlighting these trends is an undoubtedly important task. But is it
 accurate to conclude that the kind of democracy establishing itself is more
 akin to a re-instatement of powerful constellations of state and politico-
 business oligarchs through new institutions?6 Arriving at such a conclusion
 would seem to rely too heavily on understanding transition dynamics as a
 causally contingent struggle between salient socio-economic forces.
 1 Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury, Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia
 (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1999); Geoff Forrester, ed., Post-Soeharto Indonesia:
 Renewal or Chaos (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1999); R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 2000:
 A Shaky Start for Democracy," Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 1 (2001), pp. 208-224.
 2 Douglas Webber, "A consolidated patrimonial democracy? Democratization in post-Suharto
 Indonesia," Democratization, vol. 13, no. 3 (2006), pp. 396-420.
 3 Vedi Hadiz, "Reorganizing Political Power in Indonesia: A Reconsideration of so-called
 Democratic Transitions," Pacific Review, vol. 16, no. 4 (2003), pp. 591-611.
 4 Vedi Hadiz, "The Rise of Neo-Third Worldism? The Indonesian Trajectory and the
 Consolidation of Illiberal Democracy," Third World Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1 (2004), pp. 55-71.
 5 Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison, "Neo-liberal Reforms and Illiberal Consolidations: The
 Indonesian Paradox," Journal of Development Studies, vol. 41, no. 2 (2005), pp. 220-241.
 6 Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz, Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an
 Age of Markets (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
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 Given that a decade has passed since the initial transition, it seems
 appropriate to consider Indonesia's politics of democratization further. In
 what follows, I argue that understanding transition dynamics as primarily a
 structurally conditioned social conflict is increasingly unsatisfactory for this
 task. Rather, democratization is more intelligible in terms of the interplay
 between political action and institutions. This is because human actors who
 shape change in particular settings must turn structural factors into political
 resources.7 The important question to ask then is whether the interplay
 actually begins to undermine oligarchic dominance democratically, or
 reinscribes it. This is a tricky question to answer, for sure, especially as
 Indonesia's transformation, in common with other democratizations, is
 anything but straightforward. In fact, it is probably safer to say there are no
 simple categorizations, but rather matters of time and degree. And in
 Indonesia's case, the tactical decision to alter the highly centralized state
 structures of the Soeharto era is just one step forward in an uneven process.8
 Yet, the introduction of this crucial, albeit limited, variable to the political
 system has lessened the effectiveness of oligarchic reorganization.
 Debating post-authoritarianism
 Certainly, Indonesia's transition has been no easy ride since 1998.9 Even
 after unprecedented socio-political change, the configuration of power
 relations seemed to favour oligarchic persistence.10 Indeed, a legacy of
 corporatist centralization was always going to make democratic re-arrangement
 vis-a-vis political power a complicated affair.11 And the country continues to
 experience widespread corruption and officials, especially the judiciary,
 remain open to bribery and graft.12 Hardly a unique situation, one of the
 lessons from the democratization literature is that legacies of authoritarian
 rule can constrain a polity's rearticulation even as the old institutional
 structures unravel.13 In some cases, institutions can pretty much stall in a
 7 Yong Cheol Kim, R. William Liddle and Salim Said, "Political Leadership and Civilian
 Supremacy in Third Wave Democracies: Comparing South Korea and Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, vol.
 79, no. 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 247-268.
 8 James Aim, Robert H. Aten and Roy Bahl, "Can Indonesia Decentralize Successfully? Plans,
 Problems and Prospects," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 37, no. 1 (2001), pp. 83-102.
 9 Geoffrey Hainsworth, Sarah Turner and David Webster, "Introduction: Indonesia's democratic
 struggle: Reformasi, Otonomi and Participasi," Asia Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 48, no. 1 (2007), pp. 41-46.
 10 Dan Slater, "The Ironies of Instability in Indonesia," Social Analysis, vol. 50, no. 1 (Spring
 2006), pp. 208-213.
 11 Mark Turner, Owen Podger, Maria Samardjono and Wayan K. Tirthayasa, Decentralization in
 Indonesia: Redesigning the State (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2003).
 12 One merely has to consider the scandals surrounding the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
 Agency (IBRA) , the State Logistics Agency (Bulog) or the Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance (BLBI)
 to appreciate the scale of the problem.
 13 Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," Comparative Politics, vol. 22, no. 1 (1990), pp.
 359-377; Terry Lynn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics, vol.
 23, no. 1 (1990), pp. 1-23.
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 "frozen" political condition or retreat back into what Marina Ottoway has
 termed "a semi-authoritarian condition."14 In other words, the context within
 which a transition takes place is a significant part of future developments.
 With this in mind, a central concern to any examination of Indonesia's
 transition dynamics is whether the new democratic institutions taking shape
 destabilize asymmetries of political power or are a priori the subaltern to
 powerfully entrenched oligarchy, patronage and money politics. Certainly,
 the kind of democracy establishing itself exhibits patrimonial tendencies but
 to postulate their causal primacy in shaping institutions is altogether more
 contestable. In fact, to rely on this constant conjunctive to understand
 transition dynamics is a somewhat unwieldy reification of the subject of
 inquiry. As such, it inadvertently consigns transitology and its focus on elite
 political activity to the dustbin of "outdated sociology."15 This is despite the
 fact that decision making and compromise have played crucial roles in
 steering courses for successful and stable transitions.16 It may seem a
 counterintuitive understanding of social change but the pragmatic
 interactions of political elites smooth the renegotiation of new social contracts
 without undue social disturbance. Considering their implications is,
 therefore, integral to understanding the dynamics of regime change.
 Having said this, it would be naive to assume that things change in a free-
 play of unimpeded political-agency.17 There is no direct, unmediated or
 irreversible shift from regime A to regime B. If we are to appreciate the
 significance of strategic interactions, "it is necessary to grasp that those
 making major political decisions are not operating from a tabula rasa - merely
 projecting the most feasible solutions."18 In fact, there is always the possibility
 that political actors will favour certain interests and familiar arrangements.
 Yet, their decisions "can alter power relations, set loose new political
 processes, and lead to different (if often unintended) outcomes."19 This
 means that the exclusionary practices of competing social forces do not
 guarantee plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose.
 14 Marina Ottoway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC:
 Carnegie Foundation, 2003).
 15 Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Renegotiating Boundaries: Access, Agency and Identity in Post-
 Suharto Indonesia," Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde vol. 159, no. 4 (2003), pp. 551.
 16 Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University
 of California Press, 1 990) ; Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore:
 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence
 Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies
 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
 17 Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" Slavic Review, vol. 54 no. 1 (1995), pp.
 1 1 1-127; Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," Comparative
 Political Studies, vol. 33, no. 6-7 (2000), pp. 703-734; Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Transitions in
 Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics, vol. 26, no. 3 (1994), pp. 355-375.
 18 Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," American Political
 Science Review, vol. 59 (December 1965), p. 974.
 19 O'Donnell et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, p. 38.
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 One does not have to adopt an overly paradigmatic attitude to make this
 observation, as transitions are often ambiguous.20 That is to say, the decisions
 made by political actors, during and after a transition phase, are not without
 baggage. A connection exists between the preferences and capacities of
 political actors and the conditions in which they appeared. How could it be
 otherwise? The past developmental patterns and underlying societal
 conventions in particular settings influence the emergence of distinct trade-
 offs and unexpected institutional transformations. In fact, it is probably fairer
 to say that the politics of pragmatic democratic change more often than not
 serve the interests of established elites.21 Yet, what we recognize here, in a
 very Aristotelian way, is that political activity is what constitutes stable futures
 from troubled pasts.
 This is worth remembering given that the study of democratization is a
 focus on the process of establishing a political system. As such, our concern
 is with the process by which relevant political actors find how best to continue
 to submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of democratic
 institutions.22 To establish an institutionalized democratic process takes
 strategic interactions and tactical decisions on, amongst other things, new
 constitutional arrangements, the rules of future political competition, and
 the dismantling of the structures of authoritarian rule.23 In these terms,
 broadening the legitimate framework of political contestation is a route to
 undermining the grip of authoritarian-minded oligarchs. Significantly,
 institutional reform provides an organizational context with the potential
 to promote and cultivate different behaviour. That is to say, over time, the
 negotiation of significant, if incomplete, institutional reform requires a
 modification of elite behaviour, however slight, to more representative and
 competitive politics.
 Historical legacies and legitimacy
 Before going any further, I need to give a bit of background on the
 significance of Indonesia's decision to decentralize. To begin with, the
 archipelago is amazingly diverse, both geographically and ethno-
 demographically. Despite this, historically, political elites have resisted
 representational challenges to their authority. Either for them you have
 power or you do not. In fact, powerful constituencies, especially the military,
 20 Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
 2002), pp. 2-3.
 21 Geoffrey Pridham, "Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation in
 Southern Europe," West European Politics, vol. 13, no. 4 (1990), pp. 103-117.
 22 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and
 Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26.
 23 Andreas Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation?" Journal of Democracy, vol. 9, no. 2
 (1998), pp. 91-107.
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 are deeply suspicious of politico-territorial fragmentation.24 Their strong
 commitment to a unified political identity is, in the main, borne out of the
 anti-colonial struggle for independence.25 This is something reflected in the
 institutional centralization of the nation-state and the post-independence
 rule of both Soekarno and Soeharto. But it was Soeharto, in particular, who
 de-politicized societal identity vis-a-vis a form of centralized state corporatism.
 He achieved this through systematic combinations of co-optation and
 repression.26 In this context, the introduction of the decentralization initiative
 is a considerable achievement for and alteration to Indonesian politics.
 To elaborate: the bulk of Soeharto's legitimacy rested on the promise of
 stability and economic growth rather than any sort of representative plurality.
 To shore this up and remove threats to his regime, he also set about the
 social construction of a "floating mass" populace (massa mengambang) . This
 involved a systemic disorganization of civil society as means to this end. He
 banned political parties at the village level and either suppressed or co-opted
 any form of collective organization.27 In fact, the restructuring of the electoral
 system in 1971 virtually prohibited all membership-based organizations
 autonomous of the government.28 When one considers the relevance of such
 organizations to the growth of democracy in other developing countries, the
 decision to decentralize Indonesia's political system appears even more
 significant.29
 Soeharto went on to operationalize his dominance of the state
 administration through Golkar (Golongan Karya), a conglomeration of
 functional groupings. Sitting at the apex of this political structure, he then
 extended state patronage across the archipelago through Golkar and a vast
 network of state officials and business interests.30 Access to state revenues
 came via these patronage networks, all of which remained firmly attached
 to a highly centralized corporatist style of rule. In fact, the 1970s and early
 1980s boom in resource exports shielded, for a time at least, the viability of
 this form of rule from market realities. As long as public revenues from the
 24 Gabriele Ferrazzi, "Using the 'F' Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse,"
 The Journal of Federalism, vol. 30, no. 2 (2000), pp. 63-85.
 25 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press, 2004).
 26 Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the 'Third Wave of Democratization': the Indonesian Pro-Democracy
 Movement in a Changing World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
 27 Michele Ford, "Continuity and Change in Indonesian Labour Relations in the Habibie
 Interregnum," Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 28, no. 2 (2000), pp. 59-88.
 28 The three co-opted political parties that remained were Golkar, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI
 - Indonesian Democratic Party) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP - United Development
 Party).
 29 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor
 Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Dietrich
 Rueschmeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens and John Stephens, Capitalist Development andDemocracy (Chicago:
 Chicago University Press, 1992).
 30 Andrew Maclntyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991) .
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 likes ofPertamina, the state-owned oil and gas monopoly, kept flowing, they
 conditionally underwrote the economic success story. In the meantime,
 Soeharto, an archetypal "crony capitalist," used state companies as cash cows
 for his family members and close associates.
 Nevertheless, even as oil monies poured in, foreign investment fell in the
 face of restrictively high subsidies given to state-owned companies.31 As the
 state control mechanisms began to creak under the pressure of globalization,
 rumblings of elite dissension emerged. Indonesia's violent convulsion in the
 wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis brutally exposed the friability of
 Soeharto's style of patrimonial corporatism. It effectively short-circuited the
 patronage networks and, as the crisis of regime legitimacy worsened,
 Soeharto's corpora tist grip looked increasingly unsustainable.
 Strategic interactions and critical junctures
 Given this context, the time for strategic decision making had arrived.
 Soeharto's successor, BJ Habibie, went on to play a significant "soft-liner"
 role during the transition from authoritarian rule. In fact, Habibie, in some
 respects, facilitated a further democratic opening. Between May 1998 and
 November 1999, Habibie "presided over a remarkable and almost
 Gorbachevesque period of political reform."32 It was his mixture of
 pragmatism and fear of grassroots insurrection that made a democratic
 compromise possible. He lacked outright legitimacy as the new president
 and, therefore, had little strategic alternative other than compromise in an
 attempt at reestablishing legitimate credentials. This led to the acceptance
 of moderate opposition figures onto the political playing field, in the shape
 of Nahdlatul Ulama s Abdurrahman Wahid, Soekarno's daughter Megawati
 Sukarnoputri, Muhammadiyah 's Amien Rais and the Sultan of Yogyakarta,
 Hamengkubuwono X.33
 As the democratization literature indicates, in situations like these, a
 critical juncture of compromise between elite political figures can develop,
 especially when faced with popular pressure from below.34 This is what creates
 the space for unexpected policy reform and unintended outcomes to emerge.
 In the Indonesian case, Habibie's decision to devolve government authority
 31 Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons (Sydney: Allen &
 Unwin, 1999).
 32 David Bourchier, "Habibie's Interregnum: Reformasi, Elections, Regionalism and the Struggle
 for Power," in C. Manning and P. van Diermen, eds., Indonesia in Transition: Social Aspects of Reformasi
 and Crisis (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), p. 15.
 33 Megawati Sukarnoputri entered competitive electoral politics through PartaiDemokrasi Indonesia
 - Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle) as did Amien Rais with Partai Amanat
 Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) and Abdurrahman Wahid with Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa
 (PKB, National Awakening Party).
 34 Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition in Latin America and Eastern
 Europe," International Social Science Journal, vol. 43, no. 128 (1991), pp. 274.
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 is one such example. This unprecedented attempt to manage growing societal
 pressure created an unanticipated adjustment of structural asymmetries.
 The decision to decompress tensions via decentralization (desentralisasi)
 introduced a political devolution of government authority, and new fiscal
 and revenue-raising powers. Designed to promote greater regional autonomy
 (otonomi daerah) and enacted through Law no. 22/1999 (Regional
 Governance) and Law no. 25/1999 (Fiscal Arrangements), formal
 implementation took place on 1 January 2001. It meant that the province
 (provinsi) , regency (kabupateri) and city (kota) were all now political and fiscal
 players in the newly devolved structure. By August 2001, President Megawati
 Sukarnoputri had also honoured a commitment to introduce autonomy
 legislation for the two special regions (daerah daerah istimewd) of Aceh and
 Papua through Laws no. 18 and no. 21, respectively.
 Difficult steps in a challenging process
 However, it is usually best to measure such things by degrees. The overhaul
 of Soeharto's intensely centralized power structure was never going to be a
 universal panacea. For instance, Golkar's administrative entrenchment
 weighed heavily in the newly devolved political structure.35 And the
 Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI - Tentara Nasional Indonesia) still exert a
 strong influence despite the constitutional removal of their dual function
 (dwifungsi) role. This was mainly due to the TNI's substantial business
 interests and their continued links to major political players. 36 Actually, the
 national decentralization initiative remains subject to much legitimate
 criticism and continues to challenge the early optimism.37
 From the outset, the 1999 legislation contained many inconsistencies,
 creating a recipe for confusion and poor implementation. This meant that
 its effectiveness varied widely across the archipelago. There was also the
 assumption that local governments would be better at dealing with local
 needs and problems. This proved to be a rather sanguine expectation,
 brought in to stark relief with the proliferation (pemekaran) of administrative
 districts.
 35 Anthony Smith, "Indonesia: Transforming the Leviathan," in J. Funston, ed., Government and
 Politics in Southeast Asia (London: Zed Books Limited, 2001 ) , pp. 74-1 1 7.
 36 Lesley McCulloch, "Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business," in J.
 Brommelhorster and W.C. Paes, eds., The Military as Economic Actor - Soldiers in Business (London:
 MacMillan Palgrave, 2003), pp. 94-124; Marcus Mietzner, "Business as usual? The Indonesian armed
 forces and local politics in the post-Soeharto era," in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Local Power
 and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
 Studies 2003), pp. 245-58.
 37 Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyanto and Carole Faucher, Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia
 (London: Routledge, 2005); Ed Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., Local Power and Politics in Indonesia:
 Decentralization and Democratization (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); Damien
 Kingsbury and Harry Aveling, eds., Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia (London/New York:
 RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
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 Given the rapid expansion of new undertakings, existing institutional
 practice was, in some respects, inappropriately equipped to deal with it. Over
 a hundred sub-divisions of regencies took place between 1999 and 2004,
 increasing the total number by roughly 50 percent. By 2005, 33 provinces
 and some four hundred and fifty regencies and cities were in existence. This,
 along with a lack of guidelines from central government, led to significantly
 different takes on the new political and fiscal responsibilities. In some
 respects, pemekaran magnified rent-seeking behaviour and revenue
 mismanagement.38 Many local administrations simply lacked the appropriate
 technical capacity and personnel. In fact, service delivery, instead of
 improving overnight, actually deteriorated in places like Northern Sulawesi
 and Southern Sumatra. Community marginalization issues in Kalimantan
 and Sulawesi also did little to alleviate matters.39 And local indigenous
 populations (putra daerah, native son) began demanding priority for regional
 government jobs, ahead of migratory newcomers (pendatang) .40 Having said
 this, the introduction of legislative amendments in October 2004 did improve
 some of these shortcomings by placing renewed emphasis on addressing
 administrative disputes and budget mismanagement, local accountability
 and closer monitoring by central government. 41
 Transforming continuity with the past
 Evidently, the politics of pragmatic democratic change is anything but
 smooth. Nevertheless, crafting institutional change has done more than
 decant old wine into new bottles. The decentralized political system has
 helped widen intra-elite competition, albeit by degrees.
 Despite ongoing rent-seeking behaviour, new political configurations are
 more than a reassertion of oligarchy in a different guise. Representative
 contestation and accountability now extends to a broader range of both
 bureaucrats and local leaders. This means they are in competition politically
 for not only resources and taxation but also, ultimately, votes.42 Performance
 is beginning to matter. There is now incentive to appear, at least, to be more
 inclusive and constituent friendly. The upshot is that this influences, however
 38 Fitria Fitrani, Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, "Unity in Diversity? The creation of new local
 governments in a decentralizing Indonesia," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 41 , no. 1 (2005) ,
 pp. 57-79.
 39 Christopher R. Duncan, "Mixed Outcomes: The Impact of Regional Autonomy and
 Decentralization on Indigenous Ethnic Minorities in Indonesia," Development and Change, vol. 38, no.
 4 (2007), pp. 711-733.
 40 This may be little more than parochial opportunism in many areas but it is still a worrying
 trend.
 41 Law no. 32/2004 (Regional Government) enacted these amendments.
 42 Sebastian Eckardt, "Political accountability, fiscal conditions and local government
 performance - cross-sectional evidence from Indonesia," Public Administration and Development, vol. 28
 no. 1 (2008), pp. 1-17.
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 slightly, policy decisions and priorities. Multiple elites also mean that
 marriages of convenience and compromise take place between political
 parties with similar local interests but different national agendas. This
 involves, in certain instances, a putting aside of national differences to assert
 local governance against central interference. In other words, the increased
 contestation of regional politics brings with it a gradual destabilization of
 the centralized nexus of political power.
 In West Sumatra, for instance, a formidable Golkar party backed former
 governor Zainal Bakar as he came from within the state bureaucracy. Yet, to
 pigeonhole Bakar as an exclusive reflection of "old" power would be
 somewhat misleading. His parliamentary allies represented a mixture of
 regional and national political interests. More significantly, the reputation
 for integrity of the new governor, Gamawan Fauzi, is a welcome fillip,
 especially given Bakar's implication in several corruption cases.43
 In broader terms, two consecutive free and fair elections and a transfer
 of power from incumbent opposition means that Indonesia has passed a key
 litmus test of democratic consolidation.44 The effectivenjess of the General
 Elections Commission (KPU) is also a major encouragement.45 Moreover,
 the inauguration of the new Regional Representatives Council (DPD, Dewan
 Perwakilan Daerah) is symbolically (and structurally) a significant step for
 improving representation. It, in effect, creates a bicameral second chamber
 of parliament. This acts as a sort of upper house, albeit with extremely limited
 powers.46 For instance, the DPD possesses no veto over the budget. Having
 said this, altering the composition of parliament may lessen regional distrust
 of central government. In theory, there is the potential to give Indonesia's
 diverse communities a greater representational presence in Jakarta. Likewise,
 since 2005, Pilkada (local elections) for hundreds of governors (gubernur),
 regents (bupati) and city mayors (walikota) has certainly altered the political
 landscape, with about 40 percent of incumbents replaced.47 Whether there
 has been dramatic change in the new incumbents' representational priorities
 is, however, harder to gauge. Yet, greater competition for office, logistically
 at least, represents a gradual dilution of the system of top-down executive
 appointments and manipulated assembly votes. This is not to say things are
 all plain sailing. In terms of institutionalization, the party system is still captive
 43 James Davidson, "Politics-as-usual on trial: regional anti-corruption campaigns in Indonesia,"
 Pacific Review, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 75-99.
 44 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century (Oklahoma:
 University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 263.
 45 The 2004 elections heralded improved civilian rule over the military, a meaningful and
 extensive number of permitted political parties, stabilized election rules, amendments to the
 decentralization legislation and constitutional limitations on the power of the executive.
 46 Since 2004, the restructured People's Consultative Assembly (MPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan
 Rakyat) consists entirely of popularly elected members sitting in the People's Representative Council
 (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) and the new DPD.
 47 Douglas E. Ramage, "A Reformed Indonesia," Australian Financial Review, 12 October 2007.
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 to personality politics and most parties are widely seen as corrupt and self-
 interested.48
 Yudhoyono's impact
 On the other hand, the president and vice-president now have to stand
 as a team. This is supposed to encourage moderate candidates, who have
 the capacity to form alliances across party lines.49 In fact, President Susilo
 Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) may be ex-military but he is politically acute and
 displays a commitment to the new democratic framework.50 Although high
 on rhetoric, he has at least sought to stabilize the economy and combat
 corruption.51 In a Przeworskian sense, SBY readily submits his interests and
 values to the uncertain interplay of democratic institutions. He also shows
 little fear in reshuffling his cabinet and disrupting the cosy political cartel
 of previous administrations. Recent infusions of high-level civilian
 technocratic expertise reinforce this point. For instance, in 2005, he replaced
 Coordinating Minister for the Economy Aburizal Bakrie (head of the Bakrie
 Brothers conglomerate, a major economic vehicle of the Soeharto era) with
 Dr. Boediono.52 Likewise, prominent economist Dr. Sri Mulyani Indrawati
 came in as the new finance minister, with SBY backing her anti-corruption
 drive. Indrawati has already sacked her director-general of taxation in 2006
 and lately overhauled the customs staff at Tanjung Priok port.53
 Moreover, the findings of the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) and
 investigations by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) are slowly
 beginning to make inroads against Indonesia's endemic nexus of corruption
 and graft.54 Their attempts to rein in the conglomerates of the Soeharto era
 may be fraught and uneven but they do show signs of progress.55 For instance,
 the KPK recently detained prosecutor Urip Tri Gunawan, business executive
 Artalita Suryani, lawmaker Hamka Yamdu and Jambi Deputy Governor
 Anthony Zeidra Abidin in connection to the BLBI case.56
 48 Paige Johnson Tan, "Indonesia Seven Years after Soeharto: Party System Institutionalization
 in a New Democracy," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 28, no. 1 (2006), pp. 88-114.
 49 R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, "Indonesia in 2005: A New Multiparty Presidential
 Democracy," Asian Survey, vol. 46, no. 1 (2006), pp. 132-139.
 50 Edward McBride, "Survey: Indonesia," The Economist, 9 December 2004.
 51 Hal Hill and Takashi Shiraishi, "Indonesia After the Asian Crisis," Asian Economic Policy Review,
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 The indications are that the institutional reform of the post-Soeharto
 political system has, albeit modestly, destabilized oligarchic proclivities.
 Indeed, elite behaviour displays modification to widening contestation that,
 in turn, creates a more inclusive form of politics. And no matter how
 constrained the potential, this has improved the system of governance and
 the possibility of a more peaceful and stable Indonesia.
 Conclusion
 Evidently, countries do not emerge from authoritarianism to multi-party
 democracy overnight. Indeed, the way political actors alter and reconstitute
 disarticulated political space can both enable and constrain the kind of
 democracy establishing itself. Yet, the activity of politics brings with it
 procedural reform and policy change from a stabilizing combination of
 pragmatism and compromise. In the Indonesian case, the crafting of a system
 with certain procedures and uncertain outcomes has, overtime, made a
 renegotiation of improved representation possible. On balance then, despite
 the complicated challenges, political governance is substantially different
 from the Soeharto era.
 Rather than an increasingly unsatisfactory understanding of transition
 dynamics, what this actually highlights is the complex role both political
 action and institutions play in post-authoritarian settings. The importance
 of which is to remind us that democratization is a process and rarely if ever
 ideal.
 University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, September 2008
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